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J. Carter Wood 
The Process of Civilization (and its Discontents): 
Violence, Narrative and History 
The field of history has much to offer to a cross-disciplinary exchange on 
discourses of violence. This is particularly so as difficulties with reliably 
quantifying past violence have caused an increasing number of historians 
(mainly from the field of crime history) to turn their attention to its “narratives,” 
“cultures,” “mentalities” or “discourses” (see, e.g., Archer 1999; D’Cruze 2000). 
This tendency, itself part of a broader historical linguistic turn, has increased the 
theoretical exchanges between history and other disciplines. While historians 
have gained a much wider conceptual palette upon which they can draw, they, in 
return, offer long-term insights and perspectives that are too often lacking in 
contemporary analyses of violence. Nonetheless, such cross-disciplinary 
approaches to violence within the humanities have not been without their 
difficulties, partly due to the increasing popularity of biological or evolutionary 
explanations for physical aggression, some of which have made use of historical 
data (Daly and Wilson 1994; Pinker 2003: 306-336). Their emphasis on 
continuities across time and space implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) 
challenges the primary role of culture stressed in most historical and 
sociological analyses, a challenge most visible in comparative studies (Wood, 
2003). Yet, even those who assert culture’s dominant role in shaping the 
experience of violence have trouble describing precisely how violence’s “social 
meaning” is formed. In an ethnographic study of civil war in Mozambique, 
Carolyn Nordstrom noted reservations regarding a key supposition of cultural 
constructionism: 
I have come to question traditional assumptions that people experience life in 
uniquely cultural-specific ways, that what happens to individuals in World War II 
Europe, in Bosnia, in Mozambique or in the Amazon Basin is fundamentally 
different and that these experiences are ultimately incommensurable, incomparable, 
unique (Nordstrom 1997: 6). 
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Nordstrom raises central questions in violence studies: how successfully can 
narrative be said to convey the experience of violence, and to what extent, if 
any, can these narratives be compared? Historians have become keenly 
interested in these topics, examining how other issues, such as masculinity, 
affect attitudes toward physical aggression (Wiener 2004). However, even 
assuming that particular discourses can be shown to have influenced attitudes 
toward violence in a particular time and place and that they have some kind of 
cross-cultural relevance, casting this insight as a historical process presents 
further difficulties. How have attitudes changed? Why have they changed? How 
is it possible to reconstruct these variations?  
A variety of conceptual tools have been used in answering these questions; 
among violence historians, Norbert Elias’s theory of the “civilizing process”, 
originally developed in the 1930s, has become one of the most prominent of 
them (e.g., Spierenberg 1995; Johnson and Monkkonen 1996; Ruff 2001). The 
civilizing process consists of a long-term historical development involving a 
general increase in the control of “affects” – emotional urges – as well as a more 
finely regulated social interaction. Two main forces have restrained human 
psychological urges toward aggression: increasing social interdependence and 
expanding state power. Beginning in the early modern period, social 
differentiation and more complex forms of the division of labor tied people 
together in ever-longer chains of mutual reliance.  
The more differentiated [social functions] become, the larger grows the number of 
functions and thus of people on whom the individual constantly depends in all his 
actions, from the simplest and most commonplace to the more complex and 
uncommon. As more and more people must attune their conduct to that of others, the 
web of actions must be organized more and more strictly and accurately, if 
individual action is to fulfill its social function. The individual is compelled to 
regulate his conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more stable 
manner (Elias 1994: 445). 
Concurrently, states’ monopolization of legitimate violence enforced “pacified 
social spaces” in which individuals restrained themselves in the knowledge that 
others, in return, would do the same (Elias 1994: 451). Thus, the likelihood of 
attack was reduced, private vengeance was increasingly replaced by state power 
and restraints on some kinds of behavior were internalized. 
Elias’s appeal to historians is clear. Although a sociologist, his evidence and 
the process he describes are historical. In his historicized picture of human 
psychology, while people have in-built tendencies toward violence, the forces 
which operate upon this innate aggression – such as increasingly complex 
matrices of social refinement – are fundamentally social and cultural. Indeed, for 
Elias, the self and the social are united and inseparable (Elias 1994: 200-215). 
His approach thus accommodates aspects of both sides in the contemporary 
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debate: rather than arguing for either biological or cultural influences on 
violence, he examines their interactions. Although there remains much room for 
questioning some of his theory’s specific assumptions or conclusions, its focus 
on the points where self and social unite (or material and cultural meet) is 
useful, and his diachronic as well as synchronic approach to violence is 
constructive. Moreover, it suits an important shift in violence history toward 
examining what now seems to have been an apparent centuries-long decline in 
interpersonal violence in western Europe (Kaspersson 2003). In short, Elias’s 
theory seems to fit the facts. 
Partly for these reasons, the civilizing process played an important role in a 
recently published book in which I explored the development of attitudes toward 
violence in nineteenth-century England (Wood 2004). Previous work had 
already suggested that English violence had declined between 1800 and 1900 
(Gatrell 1980). How and why this occurred remained unclear and became my 
main topics. Conceptually, I borrowed from Elias and Foucault and incorporated 
elements from social geography, anthropology and traditional British social 
history. My goals were to see what had happened to violence in nineteenth-
century England, test the utility of the civilizing process and develop conceptual 
approaches to the history of violence. Here, I will build upon some of my 
culturally-specific empirical findings and examine their broader relevance to the 
relationship between violence and language, the role of conflict in shaping 
mentalities of violence and the utility of the theory of the civilizing process. In 
doing so, I will also speculate on wider conceptual points which I have 
subsequently begun considering as guidelines in further research. As an initial 
note, the violence with which I intend to deal with is physical and relatively 
small-scale, arising out of “everyday” circumstances; thus, war, terrorism and 
state violence (other than policing) are not among my central concerns. I am 
skeptical about whether small-scale violence (e.g., pub brawls or domestic 
violence) and large-scale violence (e.g., war or genocide) can be analyzed with 
the same tools. I believe that analyses of a concept so contested as violence 
require differentiation and precision in terms of definition and method; what is 
more, this includes distinguishing physical violence from other forms of harmful 
social interaction, exclusion or disadvantaging (even though they may, in the 
end, have equivalent or greater long-term effects).  
Speakability, Conflict and Accommodation 
Reconstructing violence mentalities requires close attention to narratives of 
violence. There are different senses in which the term “narratives” should be 
understood. They include, most obviously, various forms of speech about 
violence – i.e., commentary about physically aggressive acts – which can be 
found in criminal court records, sociological surveys, magazines, journals and 
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newspapers. However, while things can be said about violence, they can also be 
said with violence. Anthropologists have long recognized that violence has 
expressive qualities linked to various kinds of specific cultural imperatives (e.g., 
Collett 1977; Riches 1986: 12). In my view, rather than being “unspeakable,” 
violence has tended to be eminently “speakable,” emerging out of coherent 
cultural (and biological) motivations, tending to follow certain kinds of social 
rules and containing expressive elements. The grammars and vocabularies, 
dialects and accents, voices and meanings of this violence have been historically 
and culturally specific: the syntax in which violence speaks is connected to 
particular arrangements of social structure, imagined geography and cultural 
belief. That is, what violence has to “say” varies across both time and space, and 
a violent “utterance” which may be perfectly comprehensible in one culture (or 
within one culture at a particular developmental stage) may not be so in another. 
Out of these linguistic qualities of violence emerge coherent “mentalities” of 
violence: collections of attitudes about physical aggression that are shared by a 
particular cultural group.  
The language of violence is most visible in cultures in which it is relatively 
accepted. Nineteenth-century England was one such society, with a customary 
mentality based on principles of retribution, autonomy and discipline. This 
often-scripted violence was not hidden: in fact, it was essential that it remain 
open to community observation, judgment and control (which incidentally 
helped ensure that descriptions of it were recorded as witness testimony 
gathered for criminal prosecutions). Particularly amongst the working classes, 
community relationships were “self-policed,” and criminals, deviants or 
unwanted outsiders were normally dealt with independently of the state. 
Interpersonal disputes among men were often settled through fighting rituals that 
had originated in sports: as one worker recalled, “You always settled your 
arguments with a fight. You see it was the only expression you had” (Burnett 
1994: 85). Although largely unregulated by ritual forms, domestic conflicts were 
also motivated and patterned by the customary mentality.  
Various messages and meanings could be encoded within violent acts; 
violence was often performative and remarkably public. A hidden, private fight 
or the clandestine beating of a thief would have had little purpose. Similarly, 
while deliberately murdering one’s wife was illegitimate, “disciplinary” 
violence could be used relatively freely. Private violence and intentional wife 
murder, of course, occurred – the rules of violence do not function like the laws 
of gravity. Nevertheless, the pressure of social approval tended to keep violence 
public and within socially acceptable boundaries. When limits were exceeded, 
the customary mentality provided criteria for identifying and evaluating 
transgressions, and those who observed (or participated in) public violence were 
well equipped to interpret it. These interpretations, although individual, clearly 
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emerged out of a generally shared mentality of violence. While I do not suggest 
that the resulting mentality was “fair” (even though a notion of “fairness” was 
an important component of it), it was widely accepted, provided a structure for 
physical aggression, maintained social order and made violence more 
predictable. In this regard, nineteenth-century England was not an isolated 
example, and studies across a wide chronological and geographical spectrum 
have found similar kinds of violence codes, in, for example, early modern 
France, the nineteenth-century Mediterranean, twentieth-century Yemen and 
contemporary American cities (Greenshields 1994; Gallant 2002; Caton 1999; 
Anderson 1999). 
These studies suggest the broader relevance of some of the trends I have 
identified in my own work, particularly with regard to the centrality of conflict 
in the generation and maintenance of violence mentalities. In this sense, I use 
the term conflict to refer to differences among various mentalities as well as to 
tensions within them. Such conflicts may arise through either internal or external 
forces (or some combination thereof). For instance, nineteenth-century England 
saw challenges to the customary mentality from an emergent middle- and upper-
class culture of refinement. I label this latter mentality “civilized” for two 
reasons. First, the term was common in contemporary discourse; nonetheless, I 
take a skeptical and critical attitude toward such uses (Wood 2004: 40-46). 
Second, this cultural movement’s impact was recognizably “civilizing” in 
Elias’s sense, tending toward a reduction in emotional extremes and expansion 
of state power.1 Civilized observers grew increasingly aghast at customary forms 
of violence; behavior that had once been widely accepted as normal was 
increasingly seen as abhorrent, leading to wide-ranging controversies as to 
where, when and by whom physical force could legitimately be employed. 
Custom and civilization became poles in a dialectical relationship; each was 
defined in relation to the other, and each – at least initially – was based in a 
particular social grouping. For the self-consciously “civilized” (and typically 
middle-class) observer, customary forms of behavior were re-labeled as 
“savagery.” Concurrently, those who followed custom (typically, though not 
exclusively, the working-class) associated themselves with traditional English 
virtues, seeing new civilized values as a threat to community or individual 
autonomy and the bearer of a creeping effeminacy.  
It is also clear that conflicts among violence mentalities can also develop as 
a result of intercultural encounters, especially those related to imperialism. The 
nineteenth-century British administrators of the Ionian Islands faced similar 
problems (and relied upon similar discourses) as civilizing crusaders back home; 
                                                 
1
 Like Elias, I use this latter sense of the term “civilizing” as a description of a relative degree 
of self-control and social organization without thereby implying any sort of superiority, moral 
or otherwise. 
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traditional Greek violence codes were a source of cultural conflict as well as – in 
part – a vehicle for resistance to British rule (Gallant 2002: 117-147). French 
rule in Napoleonic Italy was also influenced by a cross-cultural confluence of 
imperial, civilizing and customary imperatives regarding attitudes toward 
criminality and violence (Broers 2002). In all these cases, conflicts over 
sovereignty, autonomy, justice and identity shaped – and were in turn shaped by 
– violence mentalities. Further investigation into the historical conflicts over 
such codes of aggression is required in order to clarify whether or not recurring 
patterns in such domestic and external civilizing movements can be identified.  
“Conflict,” however, does not necessarily refer to a state of constant 
opposition: tensions typically coexist with forms of accommodation and 
consensus. For example, because of cross-class support, some traditional forms 
of sport fighting lasted relatively long into the nineteenth century. Similarly, 
because of some shared concepts of male dominance, attention to violence 
against women was long delayed. While often being seen as predominantly a 
tool of class oppression, capital punishment also had support across the social 
classes (Gatrell 1994). The social groups that tended to represent each mentality 
were often in some ways divided as well. Refined observers, for instance, 
periodically expressed fears that too much civilization could sap social vitality. 
Concurrently, an increasing proportion of the working classes were adopting 
respectable values; in some cases, this was part of a self-conscious effort at 
distinguishing themselves from their more ill-mannered neighbors. Other groups 
have demonstrated similar forms of accommodation in the context of externally 
imposed imperial rule. Local Greek social elites, for instance, successfully 
incorporated the new civilizing discourses of their nineteenth-century British 
rulers; in the process, they were able to augment more traditional forms of 
power and maintain their social status within their communities (Gallant 2002: 
214). Traditional violence codes in Italy proved to be extremely resilient to 
Napoleonic rule, and a  
world of personal vendetta and intense rivalries – small in scale but never ‘petty’ – 
proved stronger than the tidal wave of war and revolution, shaking off the 
dislocation of the former and absorbing the politicized divisions of the latter into 
itself. The ‘earth shattering events’ of the great age of European revolutions were 
sucked into this world; they did not transform it (Broers 2002:30).  
Overall, in these and other contexts, I believe that emphases on violence’s 
“speakability”, conflict and accommodation are useful elements in defining a 
widely applicable model of mentality formation.  
However, this combination is perhaps not uncontroversial. The crime 
historian Robert Sindall has argued that the recovery of some – particularly 
lower-class – attitudes about violent crime is impossible. In part this relates to a 
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fundamental lack of sources; however, Sindall argues that even if such were 
sources available, the lower-classes were unimportant to defining “crime”:
 
 
To attempt to understand crime and its relevance to nineteenth-century society the 
researcher must approach not from the bottom up, but from the middle down. 
‘Crime’ as a cause or a result of social change was not a lower socio-economic 
group act but a middle-class perception of that act. (Sindall 1990: 13) 
Although expressed in the context of a historical study, this critique is relevant 
to any study of crime, violence or deviancy; it assumes that only one set of 
attitudes is important to defining a complex cultural phenomena (i.e., “crime”) 
and suggests that these ideas are simply imposed from above. Similar views are 
not difficult to find in critical accounts of modern societies, positing 
(optimistically or pessimistically, depending on one’s point of view) the 
relatively unproblematic ability for ruling-class attitudes to become dominant. 
This notion appears in various guises, most to some extent conspiratorial. 
However, while domination and hegemony are useful analytical tools, I think 
they need to be used sparingly. Although certain classes’ perceptions of violence 
will be dominant in a given historical context (e.g., that of the Victorian 
bourgeoisie), such mentalities tend to be internally divided, rarely exist in 
isolation and face competition from other ideologies. Moreover, too great a 
focus on imposition can blind one to the importance of negotiation in forming 
violence mentalities. To understand any given culture’s attitudes toward 
violence, one has to take into account the interaction of various mentalities 
which arise out of different social groups: only through the reconstruction of 
such alignments of conflict and agreement can the contours of violence 
mentalities be revealed. Recreating these patterns is an important and continuing 
project of violence history. 
The Civilizing Process 
The issue of historical change presents a further problem, as mentalities tend to 
be self-reinforcing, with perpetrators and victims most often coming from the 
same classes and sharing basic assumptions about violence. This is, I believe, a 
typical pattern for most kinds of violence arising out of “everyday” 
circumstances. However, assuming that the violent act in question is seen as 
legitimate, how does it at some point become illegitimate? Furthermore, even if 
violence can “say” something, why does it tend to say different things over 
time? Such questions are increasingly leading me to consider the role of 
historical forces outside of the narrative process of mentality-formation itself. 
While not the only possible methodology, Elias’s theory of the civilizing process 
seems to provide a fruitful conceptual framework for further study precisely 
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because it incorporates interactions between psychology, culture and social 
relations. Nonetheless, since completing my examination of nineteenth-century 
violence, I have become more interested in certain problematic areas in Elias’s 
approach. 
The key elements of the civilizing process – growing social interdependence 
and expanding state power – dramatically transformed nineteenth-century 
society, leading to greater expectations of self-control and increasing attention to 
subtle nuances of behavior. The pattern of cultural conflict that was emerging by 
the 1820s also fit: while Elias tended to emphasize the civilizing process as a 
relatively continuous progression, it is also apparent that it has been driven by 
historically specific alignments of conflict and accommodation. In the late 
middle ages, for instance, the “courtization of warriors” saw the diminution of 
violence as conflicts were channelled into new forms centring on struggles for 
status at monarchs’ courts (Elias 1994: 465). In later eras a similar process 
functioned upon a different social landscape. The emergence of industrialism, 
the expansion of urban life and the creation of a mass society saw the civilizing 
process being impelled by other forces: e.g., class conflict. By demonstrating 
certain kinds of refined behavior, the middle classes were able to prove their 
equality to the classes above and superiority over those below. As Elias notes, 
“in the hands of the rising middle class […] the idea of what is needed to make a 
society civilized is extended,” taking in much broader aspects of society as well 
as wider sections of the population in order to liberate them from “all that was 
still barbaric or irrational in existing conditions” (Elias 1994: 39). These 
motivations set the scene for a long-term social conflict, for what is considered 
“barbaric” or “irrational” – and, thus, what is “un-civilized” – was (as it 
remains) a moving target.  
Built into the civilizing process, then, is the tendency for certain groups to 
be defined as an “uncivilized” threat to social order: this process is inherently 
discursive and cultural. At the same time, social pressure increases on lower 
classes to adopt new behavioral standards (sometimes willingly, sometimes not). 
The result is a decrease in the differences between classes’ behavioral patterns, 
but an increase in the emphasis on “nuances” or slight variations in behavior:  
The more the strong contrasts of individual conduct are tempered, the more the 
violent fluctuations of pleasure or displeasure are contained, moderated and changed 
by self-control, the greater becomes the sensitivity to shades or nuances of conduct, 
the more finely attuned people grow to minute gestures and forms, and the more 
complex becomes their experience of themselves and their world at levels which 
were previously hidden from consciousness through the veil of strong affects. (Elias 
1994: 496) 
This greater attention to the subtleties of conduct helps to ensure new forms of 
social differentiation: the constant reevaluation of current standards and attitudes 
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is at the heart of the civilizing process. With regard to violence, this tendency 
can lead to the invention of new forms of “violence” which had previously been 
accepted behavior. In nineteenth-century England, this increasingly “refined” 
sense of behavioral propriety constructed attitudes toward violence in a new 
way: as a “social problem.” This meant that discussions of violence were 
increasingly inflected by a variety of discourses. Violence came to serve as a 
vehicle for other kinds of social fears as well as beliefs regarding marriage, 
ideals of masculinity, specific forms of sport, attitudes toward outsiders and 
imaginations of national identity. Thus, it was like “crime,” which  
became (as it remains) the repository of fears which had little to do with its 
relatively trivial cost to the society and economy at large. It came to be invested with 
large significance because it provided a convenient vehicle for the expression of 
fears about social change itself (Gatrell 1990: 244). 
In the early nineteenth century, this relationship was innovative: it has 
subsequently become commonplace. Thus, Elias’s theories appear to be useful 
in the analysis of violence; however, I’d like to conclude by raising a few 
critical questions about them with regard to the relationship between the 
civilizing process and culture, the tendency for civilizing and de-civilizing 
trends to coexist and the impact of the civilizing process in different national 
contexts.  
Although the social transformations to which Elias points were 
unquestionable influences on violence, their cultural echoes remain somewhat 
difficult to pin down. It seems obvious that increasing interdependence would 
have an impact on culture and individual psychology, but these influences 
themselves have remained somewhat elusive. For instance, in what ways were 
forms of external discipline translated into internal forms of self-control? How 
did people react to states’ monopolization of legitimate force? Elias and others 
have provided suggestions in these directions, but, rather like Freud, have tended 
to see culture as repressive, taming violent tendencies produced somewhere 
deep in our psyches. While this perspective can be very useful, it also tends to 
overlook cultural motivations (and justifications) for violence. Examining 
violence in terms of its “speakability” suggests that it is not only the restraint of 
violence but also violence itself which functions linguistically. Culture does not 
only repress violence; it may in some cases enable or even demand it and, if so 
approved, organize it to maintain particular cultural imperatives or power 
configurations. Attention to these factors forms a necessary supplement to 
theoretical approaches reliant upon the civilizing process. 
A second issue relates to an assumed tendency toward increasing 
civilization. Elias was well aware of the problems of talking about social change 
in terms of quantity:  
J. Carter Wood 126
In all this we are not concerned merely with gradations, with ‘more’ or ‘less’. Each 
‘increase’ in restraints and interdependencies is an expression of the fact that the ties 
between people, the way they depend on one another, are changing, and changing 
qualitatively. […] And with the dynamic network of dependencies into which a 
human life is woven, the drives and behaviour of people take on a different form. 
(Elias 1994: 331, emphasis in original) 
He and others have also pointed to the possibility that so-called “de-civilizing” 
trends, or “set-backs” in the civilizing process can occur (Spierenburg 1995: 22; 
Dunning, Waddington, Murphy 1992: 8). However, even this helpful caveat 
tends to underestimate the complexity of the civilizing process, because 
civilizing trends tend to coexist with de-civilizing ones. For instance, the 
nineteenth century saw the development of a new, more controlled form of 
boxing. The simpler and more brutal prize-fighting it replaced had been easily 
adaptable as a model for street fighting, and it had been this sporting model 
which had ritualized male brawling. Modern boxing – which was less brutal but 
more complex – could not fulfill this role; thus, even as sport fighting became 
less deadly and as brawling in general became less acceptable, those fights that 
remained became, I believe, less predictable and, arguably, more dangerous. 
Such apparently contradictory tendencies have also been suggested in Susanne 
Karstedt’s recent study of railroad travel and violence in nineteenth-century 
Germany. Easier and faster transportation helped engender so-called “weak ties” 
among people and serious violence declined. This would seem at first glance to 
support Elias’s argument about interdependence. However, there were increased 
opportunities for minor forms of interpersonal violence such as assault (Karstedt 
2003). Moreover, the relationship between violence and civilizing tendencies is 
multifaceted. For instance, violence has been justified through eminently 
“civilized” arguments: in the nineteenth century, some advocates for the 
expanded use of corporal or capital punishment based their arguments on the 
refined motives of protecting women and children.2 Along with such apparent 
contradictions within the civilizing process, active “resistance” to civilizing 
tendencies must be taken into account. Every mentality of violence distributes 
the right to use violence in particular ways and maintains specific social 
arrangements. Each, then, has particular winners and losers; changes in violence 
discourses can impinge upon these configurations of power in ways which are 
not acceptable to everyone.  
Third, the relationship between the nation-state and civilizing trends remains 
unclear. For instance, certain forms of violence, such as ritualized male fighting, 
survived across Europe to differing extents in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. There are also more direct connections between nationality and 
                                                 
2
 Similar things could be said of more recent justifications of a nightmarish global prison 
regime in order to defend civilized values. 
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violence. In nineteenth-century England, a variety of commentators suggested 
that at least some forms of violence in England were more “civilized” than those 
in continental Europe, the United States, or, indeed, anywhere else in the world. 
This argument allowed a certain triumphal sense of national pride; however, it 
meant that when so-called “un-English” forms of violence erupted, they were all 
the more horrifying to contemporaries. More recently, this relationship has been 
reversed, and the comparatively high rates of violence and hooliganism in 
England (or by English people when abroad) has sometimes been commented 
upon as evidence of an allegedly “English disease” (Riddell 2004). The extent to 
which nations at a relatively equivalent stage of economic or social development 
– and thus with comparable levels of interdependence and state violence 
monopolies – have maintained different cultures and levels of violence points to 
the importance of examining culturally specific narratives of violence.  
In conclusion, the theory of the civilizing process has proven itself to be a 
resilient and flexible contribution to the study of violent behavior in many 
historical eras. It is particularly useful when extended and enriched by narrative 
approaches to attitudes toward violence. Emphasizing a narrative perspective 
adds a greater level of nuance and complexity when dealing with the 
phenomenon of violence against the background of a broad series of long-term 
social, economic and technological changes. At the same time, Elias’s social and 
psychological emphases help to ground cultural approaches within a more solid 
historical framework. In conclusion, and from a genuinely interdisciplinary 
point of view, I think that history can help us know a great deal more about 
“how we got here” by highlighting the historical patterns of changing attitudes 
to violence. Moreover, it can also, I believe, usefully contribute to the discussion 
about where the study of violence can go from here.  
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